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Even from the abyss of horror in which we try to feel our way today, half blind, our
hearts distraught and shattered, I look up again and again to the ancient constellations
that shone on my childhood, comforting myself with the inherited confidence that,
some day, this relapse will appear only an interval in the eternal rhythm of progress
onward and upward.
Stefan Zweig, The World of Yesterday: Memoirs of a European1
1. Introduction
It is difficult to pinpoint the exact moment at which international criminal justice ceased to be a
flourishing liberal cosmopolitan, progressive project.2 Perhaps it remains so, but with hindsight, to
advocate for it on such terms seems incomprehensibly naive; a totem of an age of idealistic
innocence, a relic of the world of yesterday.3 The pervading, palpable sense of ‘crisis’ at the heart
of the international criminal justice project has long since ended the cosmopolitan reverie and
has widened the space within international criminal scholarship for perspectives advocating
for much needed realism, pragmatism, and an increased commitment to critique.4 However,
it would appear that pervasive crisis may be resulting in a sense of ‘crisis fatigue’. It is important
at this point in time to consider the potential implications of this ‘crisis fatigue’ on both
the international criminal justice project generally and international criminal scholarship in
particular.
*Editorial Board, Associate Professor of Public International Law, Grotius Centre for International Legal Studies, Leiden
University. I am grateful to Sergey Vasiliev, Jens Iverson, Eric De Brabandere, and Ingo Venzke for their valuable insights and
comments.
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1S. Zweig, The World of Yesterday: Memoirs of a European (2009), at 3.
2For some background, see D. Robinson, ‘A Cosmopolitan Liberal Account of International Criminal Law’, (2013) 26 LJIL
127; B. Sander, ‘International Criminal Justice as Progress: From Faith to Critique’, in M. Bergsmo et al. (eds.),Historical Origins
of International Criminal Law: Volume 4 (2015), 749; G. Simpson, ‘The Conscience of Civilization and Its Discontents: A
Counter-history of International Criminal Law’, in P. Kastner (ed.), International Criminal Law in Context (2017), 9.
3See I. Tallgren, ‘The Sensibility and Sense of International Criminal Law’, (2002) 13 EJIL 561; D. Luban, ‘After the
Honeymoon: Reflections on the Current State of International Criminal Justice’, (2013) 11 JICJ 505; G. Simpson, ‘Linear
Law: The History of International Criminal Law’, in C. Schwöbel (ed.), Critical Approaches to International Criminal Law
(2014), 159; J. Rabkin, ‘Global Criminal Justice: An Idea Whose Time has Passed’, (2005) 38 CILJ 753.
4The editorial contributions of my colleagues in the International Criminal Courts and Tribunals section of LJIL have reflected
on this necessary evolution in international criminal scholarship. See C. Stahn, ‘Between “Faith” and “Facts”: ByWhat Standards
Should We Assess International Criminal Justice?’, (2012) 25 LJIL 251; D. Jacobs, ‘Sitting on the Wall, Looking In: Some
Reflections on the Critique of International Criminal Law’, (2015) 28 LJIL 1; S. Vasiliev, ‘On Trajectories and Destinations
of International Criminal Law Scholarship’, (2015) 28 LJIL 701; E. van Sliedregt, ‘International Criminal Law: Over-Studied
and Underachieving?’, (2016) 29 LJIL 1.
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For longer than it was reasonable to expect, international criminal justice’s youthful immaturity
and righteous optimism protected it from the worst of the inherent uncertainty and unpredict-
ability of the international legal order.5 Not so long ago international criminal justice was the
protégé of the international community; a golden child amongst several disappointing siblings
and cousins. It was showered with praise and shielded from criticism, its needs were fulfilled irre-
spective of the financial burden that they imposed, careful attention was given to building its self-
esteem, and it was reassured that it could be whatever it wanted to be; in short, it was given every
opportunity in life by enthusiastic, loving parents.
However, all too predictably it would seem that such a sheltered, protective upbringing, while
conducive for an idyllic childhood, has left it unprepared to deal effectively with the challenges of
adulthood. Having fled the nest of the United Nations and taken up permanent residence in the
International Criminal Court (ICC), it has struggled to find its footing in the big bad world. The
child protégé has become overwhelmed by the burden of familial expectations; where once it could
do no wrong in the eyes of its parents, now it seems it can get nothing right.6 Praise has turned to
incessant criticism and occasional bullying, the pressures of financial self-sufficiency have frustrated
its ambition, and despite its best efforts it is riddled with doubts and on the verge of burnout. It is
plain for all to see that it is struggling with the immense responsibility that has been placed on its
shoulders, and is in desperate need of a break, an intervention, for the pressure to be lifted; but despite
cries for help, it is expected to stoically continue. For certain, parental support is not entirely absent
and it retains a network of core friends, but ultimately it has to fight its own battles.
Today, at times it can seem that, wherever you look in international criminal justice, another
crisis has been declared or is thought to be lurking over the horizon.7 This Editorial looks at the
gradual replacement of international criminal justice’s progress narrative with a narrative of crisis
and discontentment. In particular, it reflects on the positive and negative impacts of ‘crisis’ on the
evolution of sophisticated approaches to international criminal scholarship.
2. Crisis and self-reflection
The precarious state of international criminal justice’s emotional well-being has not gone unnoticed,
particularly in the pages of LJIL.8 It is fair to say that the critical turn in international criminal schol-
arship has been instrumental in exposing and diagnosing the neuroses of international criminal
justice.9 As Frédéric Mégret has brilliantly shown, international criminal justice exists amidst an
exhausting fog of complex anxieties ranging from the anxiety of birth and being, to the anxiety
of demise and ultimately death.10 However, there is no causal link between the turn to critique
and international criminal justice’s existential angst; rather, as Mégret emphasizes, the turn to critique
has merely pointed to something ‘that is already intimately tormenting the discipline from within’.11
The distress may have been internalized, and be due to a host of internal factors, but it is impos-
sible to ignore the external sources of torment which it has had to combat and endure in recent
times. Conceiving of international criminal justice as existing in a state of barely concealed tor-
ment seems entirely in keeping with the troubling trajectory of the contemporary geopolitical
landscape, and its consequent erosive impact on the liberal underpinnings of the international legal
5F. Mégret, ‘The Anxieties of International Criminal Justice’, (2016) 29 LJIL 197, at 197.
6See, for example, D. Robinson, ‘Inescapable Dyads: Why the International Criminal Court Cannot Win’, (2016) 29 LJIL
323.
7S. Vasiliev, ‘The Crises and Critiques of International Criminal Justice’, Draft Paper, ICC Scholars Forum 2018, The
Hague, 15–16 June 2018. Copy on file with author.
8See, for example, D. Robinson, ‘The Identity Crisis of International Criminal Law’, (2008) 21 LJIL 925; see Robinson, supra
note 7; ‘A Cosmopolitan Liberal Account of International Criminal Law’, (2013) 26 LJIL 127; see also Mégret, supra note 6.
9See Mégret, supra note 6, at 218.
10Ibid., at 199–200.
11Ibid., at 219.
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order. From Trumpian unilateralism, isolationism and protectionism to Brexit, alongside the sinister
global rise of exclusionary nationalism, inter-ethnic conflict, demagoguery and authoritarianism, we
are confronted on a daily basis with the latest event heralding the crisis of world order.12 A product
of the ubiquity of the crisis narrative across the international legal discourse has been the recognition
of the urgent need for self-reflection about the position, function, and vulnerability of international
law in times of crisis, or, as some have put it, in ‘a dark time’.13 It has also inspired reflections on the
contingencies of international law; of what might have been.14
Significantly, the discourse has not shied away from examining whether international law is
itself in a state of crisis and may be predominantly a part of the problem rather than the solution.15
It is not entirely irrational for the epistemic community to feel a pang of heightened anxiety in the
face of current events, but fundamentally, it should not be forgotten that for good or for bad,
international law has to a large extent been forged in the crucible of global crises.16 As Hilary
Charlesworth so outspokenly put it: ‘[i]nternational lawyers revel in a good crisis. A crisis provides
a focus for the development of the discipline and it also allows international lawyers the sense that
their work is of immediate, intense relevance’.17
This is especially true of international criminal law, whose very existence is predicated on the
purportedly urgent need of humanity to eradicate impunity for shocking acts committed in the
context of past or ongoing crises.18 Moments of crisis can foretell the end of an era, inspire action,
and provide the impetus for revolutionary change;19 international criminal justice is certainly a
product of such revolutionary potential. Looking at the origins and evolution of the international
criminal justice project, it is clear that for 70 years scholars have fetishized the nativity of the
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg as representing the humanizing moment of
international law in the face of the inhumanity of global conflict. The gospel of the nativity scene
at Nuremberg, endlessly recounted in scholarship, has come to symbolize the expressive potential
of international law to respond to and emerge from epoch-defining crises, in a way that reboots
humanity and the notion of world order. The authenticity of the nativity scene has been signifi-
cantly reconsidered in recent times, with the acknowledgment that it was conceived in the hypo-
critical sin of Victors’ Justice and the absence of what has come to be expected of procedural due
12See M. Helal, ‘The Crisis of World Order and the Missing Voice of International Law’, OpinioJuris, 14 September 2018,
available at opiniojuris.org/2018/09/14/the-crisis-of-world-order-and-the-missing-voice-of-international-law/; M. Helal, ‘The
Crisis of World Order and the Constitutive Regime of the International System’, (forthcoming 2019) 46 Florida State
University Law Review, Ohio State Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper Series No. 459, available at papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3247645; P. Mishra, ‘The Globalization of Rage: Why Today’s Extremism Looks Familiar’,
(2017) 95 Foreign Affairs 46; E. Luce, The Retreat of Western Liberalism (2017); H. Kissinger, World Order (2014).
13See, forexample, the recent seminar, ‘InternationalLaw inaDarkTime’, organizedbytheErikCastrén Instituteof International
Law and Human Rights and Peking University Institute of International Law Collaboration Project, available at blogs.eui.eu/
constitutionalism-politics-working-group/cfp-seminar-doctoral-students-junior-researchers-international-law-dark-time/; 2016
ESIL Annual Conference, ‘How International Law Works in Times of Crisis’, Riga, 8–10 September 2016, available at esil-sedi.
eu/?p=1060&lang=fr; ESIL Research Forum, ‘International Law in Times of Disorder and Contestation’, Jerusalem, 28
February–1 March 2018, available at esil-sedi.eu/?p=3592&lang=fr; W. van Genugten and M. Bulterman, ‘Crises: Concern and
Fuel for International Law and International Lawyers’, (2012) 44 NYIL 3.
14See Amsterdam Centre for International Law, ‘Contingency in the Course of International Law’, 14–16 June 2018, University
of Amsterdam, available at acil.uva.nl/content/events/workshops/2018/06/contingency-in-the-course-of-international-law-how-
international-law-could-have-been.html. See also I. Venzke, ‘What If? Counterfactual (Hi)Stories of International Law’, (2018) 8
Asian Journal of International Law 403.
15In the specific context of international criminal law, see T. Krever, ‘International Criminal Law: An Ideology Critique’,
(2013) 26 LJIL 701.
16H. Charlesworth, ‘International Law: A Discipline of Crisis’, (2002) 65 Mod.L.Rev. 377. See also B. Authers and
H. Charlesworth, ‘International Human Rights Law and the Language of Violence’ (2013) Regnet Research Paper No. 2013/
18, available at papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2364212.
17H. Charlesworth, supra note 17, at 377.
18E. Bikundo, ‘Saving Humanity from Hell: International Criminal Law and Permanent Crisis’, (2013) 44 NYIL 89.
19See R. Koselleck, ‘Crisis’, (2006) 67 Journal of the History of Ideas 357.
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process. However, the fundamental point remains: from crisis came progress in the international
legal order.
A similar story attaches to the establishment of the ad hoc Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia
and Rwanda. The dominant narrative is one of a resurrection and restatement of faith in the
international legal order and the notion of supra-national criminal justice following the ending
of the decades-long dark age of the ColdWar and the guilt-ridden introspection of the international
community following its failure to intervene effectively to prevent atrocities witnessed by a global
audience.20 Amid clichéd cries of ‘never again’, the violent fallout from the collapse of the Soviet
Union on the Balkans, and the murderous, genocidal, instability of the African Great Lakes region,
international criminal justice became synonymous with a sense of global consciousness and cosmo-
politan progress.21 International criminal justice and the purported ‘end of history’ went hand-in-
hand. In the eyes of the West – particularly the United States – when staring down the barrel of
crises, recourse to international criminal justice mechanisms quickly became a panacea for the func-
tional paralysis of the structures of global peace and security.22
By the mid-to-late 1990s, Western faith in the potential of international criminal justice was
evangelical,23 and drove the crusade that culminated in the signing of the Rome Statute of the
ICC in July 1998. With the establishment of the ICC, the purported permanence of the commitment
of global justice was formally consecrated and made flesh; ‘a gift of hope’,24 ‘a utopian ideal had
become a real and tangible reality which would, from that point onwards, need to be combined
with international relations’.25 However, from the moment of its creation, the ICC has struggled
with the immensity of the expectations placed on its shoulders by its founding congregation. Its
mandate was framed as diffuse and all encompassing; preventative, deterrent, punitive, restorative
and reconciliatory amongst others.26 It was hailed as the messiah and expected to perform miracles
as a matter of routine. It is not surprising therefore that it would not be long before its mortality
would be exposed and doubt and scepticism would become a more dominant feature of the dialectic.
That global crises have driven the development of international criminal law is a recurring trope
of the mainstream historical narrative. There is a clear sense of attachment to the global crises that
spurred the emergence of the discipline. Such an attachment is far from unique in international legal
scholarship. In this respect, it is worth recalling Charlesworth’s observation that:
a parallel can be drawn between the international law [and in this instance, the international
criminal law] attachment to crises and the way that traditional forms of history have con-
centrated on “great men”.27
However, right now international criminal scholarship is less frequently concerned with
international criminal law’s ability to respond to global crises, but rather is increasingly focused
on the crisis of legitimacy critique that has ensnared the discourse.28 Some 20 years after the sign-
ing of the Rome Statute, international criminal justice lurches from one apparent catastrophe to
20G. Bass, Stay the Hand of Vengeance (2002), at 203.
21M. Mutua, ‘Never Again: Questioning the Yugoslav and Rwanda Tribunals’, (1997) Temple International and
Comparative Law Journal 167.
22F. Mégret, ‘Justice in Times of Violence’, (2003) 14 EJIL 327, at 334: referring to international criminal law as a ‘palliative
to sovereign failure’.
23D. Koller, ‘The Faith of the International Criminal Lawyer’, (2008) 40 N.Y.U.J.Int’l Law & Pol. 1019.
24UN Secretary General, ‘Establishing International Criminal Court will be fitting way to inaugurate newmillennium’, Press
Release, UN. Doc. SG/SM/6895, 16 February 1999, available at www.un.org/press/en/1999/19990216.sgsm6895.html.
25Speech of the President of the Assembly of States Parties, Mr Sidiki Kaba, 15th session of the Assembly of States Parties,
16 November 2016, available at asp.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP15/ASP15-Opening-Statement-PASP-ENG.pdf.
26See M. Damaška, ‘What is the Point of International Criminal Justice?’, (2008) 83 Chi-Kent L.Rev. 329.
27H. Charlesworth, supra note 17, at 388.
28See S. Vasiliev, ‘Between International Criminal Justice and Injustice: Theorising Legitimacy’, in N. Hayashi and
C.M. Bailliet (eds.), The Legitimacy of International Criminal Tribunals (2017), at 66. See generally Hayashi and Bailliet, ibid.
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another, experiencing not a moment of crisis, but rather a persistent state of crisis. The permanent
state of emergency of international criminal justice has been normalized to the extent that, as
Sergey Vasiliev has put it, ‘[t]he language of crisis is now a cliché’,29 with it rarely being utilized
as a meaningful analytical tool.30 With crisis normalized, the potential for change and develop-
ment has been replaced with a defensive posture from the project’s supporters. The crisis discourse
as it has been out played in the media, the commentariat and in scholarship, has become exhaust-
ing. One way to emerge from this sense of ‘crisis fatigue’ is to accept that, however nostalgic the
historical narrative, the international criminal justice project has never existed blissfully free of
internal or external crises of one form or another; that crisis far from being the exception has
in fact been the norm all along. To continue to contend otherwise is to condemn the discourse
to ‘a sort of disciplinary hamster wheel’.31
Nevertheless, the cumulative effect of a number of recent developments has left international
criminal justice, and in particular the ICC, in an exceptionally vulnerable state. Between state
withdrawals from the Rome Statute and the erosion of African Union support for and co-oper-
ation with the ICC, the resurgence in hostile, overtly aggressive rhetoric from the United States
towards the Court,32 and a pervasive sense of underperformance and ineffectiveness embodied in
the collapse of high-profile cases and the issuance of controversial acquittal judgments, the ICC
and the international criminal justice project generally has rarely had to navigate stormier seas.33
Over the course of 2018 it was impossible to ignore the wealth of mainstream attention given to
commemorating the twentieth anniversary of the signing of the Rome Statute, the entry into force
of the crime of aggression, as well as the legacy of the Yugoslav Tribunal following the conclusion
of its mandate on 31 December 2017. There has been no shortage of international conferences,
journal special issues, edited collections, and blog-posts, dedicated to examining where
international criminal justice finds itself as it enters the third decade after Rome. There is great
potential for growth in this moment of self-reflection but it can only be realized if the process is
genuine, honest, and takes on board discomforting perspectives offered by voices other than those
of the mainstream.
3. Crisis and progress
In the last Editorial by a member of the International Criminal Courts and Tribunals section of
LJIL, Elies van Sliedregt noted the growing sense of disillusionment and discontentment with the
international criminal justice project. She emphasized that in this context:
ICL scholarship should be more than just dissecting legal provisions and commenting on
judgments. ICL needs scholarship that tests assumptions underlying the international
29See Vasiliev, supra note 8.
30Ibid., Vasiliev identifies two notable exceptions in this regard: M.V.S. Sirleaf, ‘Regionalism, Regime Complexes and the
Crisis in International Criminal Justice’, (2016) 54 Colum.J.Transnat’l.L. 699; and S. Kendall, ‘Critical Orientations: A Critique
of International Criminal Court Practice’, in C. Schwöbel (ed.), Critical Approaches to International Criminal Law (2014).
31D. Kennedy, ‘When Renewal Repeats: Thinking Against the Box’, (2000) 32 N.Y.U.J.Int’l Law & Pol. 335, at 407. A similar
argument is made by Charlesworth, supra note 17, at 391.
32For example: ‘As far as America is concerned, the ICC has no jurisdiction, no legitimacy, and no authority. The ICC claims
near-universal jurisdiction over the citizens of every country, violating all principles of justice, fairness, and due process. We will
never surrender America’s sovereignty to an unelected, unaccountable, global bureaucracy’, H.E. Donald Trump, ‘Address by the
President of the United States of America’, 73rd Session of the United States General Assembly Annual General Debate, New
York, 25 September 2018, available at gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/gastatements/73/us_en.pdf. ‘We will not cooperate with
the ICC. We will provide no assistance to the ICC. We will not join the ICC : : : We will let the ICC die on its own. After all, for
all intents and purposes, the ICC is already dead to us’, J. Bolton, ‘Speech to the Federalist Society’,Al Jazeera, 10 September 2018,
available at www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/09/full-text-john-bolton-speech-federalist-society-180910172828633.html.
33While there have been frequent cries of ‘crisis’ from the both the Court’s supporters and detractors, little attention has
been given to contemplating the geopolitical fallout should the Court ever actually succumb to crises.
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criminal justice system, if only to temper expectations. It needs scholarship that engages with
those pushing a normative, idealist or political agenda. It needs scholarship that studies the
system in its context and uncovers the political and social reality.34
This call for the pursuit of more sophisticated, considered, and interdisciplinary methodologies
within international criminal scholarship could not have been more timely. Some two years on
from van Sliedregt’s Editorial, there are some indications that her cry has been heeded on the
margins of international criminal justice scholarship, but it is far from having been consistently
or comprehensively answered by the mainstream.
Amongst the most striking, but entirely positive, take-aways from international criminal
justice’s festering crisis of legitimacy has been the identification and admission of the weaknesses
and myopia of the paradigms, and their consequent theoretical lenses and methodologies, under-
pinning mainstream international criminal justice scholarship.35 Mainstream scholarship in the
field has traditionally been overwhelmingly doctrinal. As Michelle Burgis-Kasthala has
commented:
[T]he dominant paradigm informing ICL scholarship is a positivist, liberal one which favours
doctrinal writing or at most, discourse analysis about the normative underpinnings of the
ICL project. Empirical research, for example as found in the social sciences, is marginal
for most legal research because normative analysis tends to displace explanation, prediction
or analyses of human behaviour.36
She notes further that, ‘most ICL work contains no explicit statement on methodology and when
they do, it is far from systematic’,37 and that ‘often there is no distinction between scholarship on
ICL and ICL scholarship in support of the field itself’.38
Burgis-Kasthala’s observations are inescapable but there is evidence that, although there is a
long way to go, the roots of more advanced interdisciplinary methodologies are beginning to get a
tentative foothold in mainstream international criminal justice scholarship. This advancement has
been motivated by deeper engagement with the crises of legitimacy and identity that attach both to
the establishment and practices of international criminal justice institutions, and the manner in
which international criminal justice scholarship has gone about addressing them. In his Editorial
in 2012, Carsten Stahn remarked on the emergence of empirical research on the goals and effects
of international criminal trials, but noted the prevailing ‘tension between “faith” (i.e., belief in the
value and worthiness of the project) and “facts” (i.e., actual and demonstrable record)’.39 He made
a plea for ‘a greater degree of realism’, the adoption of more advanced methodologies of assess-
ment, and ‘a better scientific grounding of the discipline’.40 Acknowledging the need to move away
from the faith-based, liberal paradigm, and its attendant doctrinal impulses, towards legal realism,
critique, and empiricism, suggests that the onset of the international criminal justice project’s cri-
sis of legitimacy has assisted in elevating the sophistication of international criminal scholarship;
in other words, institutional, political, and legal crises have spurred on scholarly progress.
34See van Sliedregt, supra note 5, at 5.
35M. Burgis-Kasthala, ‘Scholarship as Dialogue? TWAIL and the Politics of Methodology’, (2016) 14 JICJ 921; F. Mégret,
‘What Sort of Global Justice is “International Criminal Justice”?’, (2015) 13 JICJ 77.
36See Burgis-Kasthala, supra note 36, at 927.
37Ibid., at 929. Burgis-Kasthala does note a number of exceptions in this regard, namely: A. Smeulers et al., ‘The Selection of
Situations by the ICC: An Empirically Based Evaluation of the OTP’s Performance’, (2015) 15 Int.C.L.R. 1; and L. Sadat,
‘Crimes Against Humanity in the Modern Age’, (2013) 107 AJIL 334.
38Ibid., at 928.
39See Stahn, supra note 5, at 254.
40Ibid., at 257. See also van Sliedregt, supra note 5, at 8: ‘ICL, in pursuing original scholarship and advancing the field as a
whole, can draw on and take inspiration from legal realism’.
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One obvious example of this is the amplified register of critique and socio-legal research in
scholarship’s response to, and consideration of, the apparently interminable impasse in the rela-
tionship between the ICC and African states.41 Initiated by the issuance of the arrest warrant
against Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir in 2009, but exacerbated by the Court’s near exclusive
focus on crimes committed on the continent of Africa – in particular the attempted (but ultimately
failed) prosecutions of Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi, and Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta
and his Vice-President William Ruto – the ICC ‘Africa Crisis’ reached its nadir in 2016 with the
announcement by South Africa, Burundi and The Gambia of their intention to withdraw from the
ICC.42 The rhetoric of the disaffected states (supported by the African Union43) classed the ICC as
an institution of neo-colonial oppression; an ‘International Caucasian Court’,44 set up expressly
for the ‘persecution and humiliation of people of colour, especially Africans’.45 While the crisis
continues to be dramatically played out in the political and legal spheres,46 it has created a space
within which international criminal justice’s inherent selectivity, as well as its historical links with
hegemonic power and structural inequalities, could begin to be explored in mainstream scholar-
ship.47 It has also created space within which to examine the lived experiences of international
criminal justice.48
Particularly exciting in this respect has been the increasing prominence of a TWAIL critique of
international criminal justice.49 A recent symposium in the Journal of International Criminal
Justice, entitled ‘Third World Approaches to International Criminal Law’, posed a series of here-
tofore under-examined questions such as:
What does it mean to think about international [criminal] law’s norms, rules, institutions
and procedures through the frames of the colonial past or imperial present? What biases,
41See generally K. Clarke, A. Knotterus and E. De Volder, Africa and the ICC: Perceptions of Justice (2016); C. Jalloh and
I. Bantekas, The International Criminal Court and Africa (2017).
42For an overview see M. Ssenyonjo, ‘State Withdrawals from the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court:
South Africa, Burundi and The Gambia’, in Jalloh and Bantekas, ibid., at 214.
43See the AU ‘Withdrawal Strategy Document’, available at www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/supporting_resources/icc_
withdrawal_strategy_jan._2017.pdf.
44See S. O’Grady, ‘Gambia: The ICC Should be Called the International Caucasian Court’, Foreign Policy, 26 October 2016.
45Ibid.
46Particularly in the context of the Al Bashir case and the ongoing issue of the relationship between the Rome Statute and
the applicability of head of state immunity. See Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Revised Order on the Conduct of
the Hearing Before the Appeals Chamber in the Jordan Referral re Al-Bashir Appeal, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09 OA2,
30 August 2018; Media Advisory, ‘Al Bashir Case: ICC Appeals Chamber Hearing Submission on Legal Matters Raised
by Jordan from 10-14 September’, ICC, available at www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=ma232.
47For a small selection of this burgeoning field see, for example, Clarke, Knotterus and De Volder, supra note 42; S. Nouwen
and W. Werner, ‘Doing Justice to the Political: The International Criminal Court in Uganda and Sudan’, (2010) 21 EJIL 942;
A. Tiemessen, ‘The International Criminal Court and the Politics of Prosecutions’, (2014) 18 IJHR 444; W. Kaleck, Double
Standards: International Criminal Law and the West (2015); A. Kiyani, ‘Group-Based Differentiation and Local Repression:
The Custom and Curse of Selectivity’, (2016) 14 JICJ 939; Krever, supra note 16; C. Schwöbel (ed.), Critical Approaches to
International Criminal Law (2014).
48See, for example, S. Nouwen, ‘“As You Set Out for Ithaka”: Practical, Epistemological, Ethical, and Existential’, (2014) 27
LJIL 227; S. Kendall and S. Nouwen, ‘Representational Practices at the International Criminal Court: The Gap Between
Juridified and Abstract Victimhood’, (2013) 76 Law and Contemporary Problems 235; K. Clarke, Fictions of Justice: The
International Criminal Court and the Challenge of Legal Pluralism in Sub-Saharan Africa (2009).
49See generally the symposium entitled, ‘Third World Approaches to International Criminal Law’ in (2016) 14 JICJ at
915–1030. Earlier outliers of TWAIL scholarship on international criminal law include: A. Anghie and B.S. Chimni,
‘Third World Approaches to International Law and Individual Responsibility’, (2003) 2 Chinese Journal of International
Law 77; C. Jalloh, ‘Regionalizing International Criminal Law?’, (2009) 9 Intl.C.L.R. 445; and O.C. Okafor and U. Ngwaba,
‘The International Criminal Court as a “Transitional Justice” Mechanism in Africa: Some Critical Reflections’, (2015) 9
International Journal of Transitional Justice 90.
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blind spots, political motives and rhetorical tropes emerge from the ways in which
international criminal justice mechanisms navigate the racial and socio-economic cleavages
that persist between North and South?50
The symposium sought not to be reflexively critical, but rather to ‘identify possibilities and alter-
natives to that which it problematizes, and new avenues of exploration for scholars working out-
side of the TWAIL tradition’.51 The symposium’s invitation for further interdisciplinary
collaboration and dialogue should be echoed and replicated throughout the international criminal
justice discourse.
In this vein collaborations could be deepened with disciplines such as social psychology, crimi-
nology, anthropology, feminist theory and international relations. The interaction of diverse dis-
ciplinary voices on issues can only lead to enlightened perspectives which offer greater clarity and
insight into issues central to the question of international criminal law’s legitimacy. If crisis is a
product of anxiety then surely the best way to work through those anxieties is to have them
expressed openly and reflected on by external actors; in this sense interdisciplinary dialogue
can be viewed as a therapeutic exercise.
4. Drawing the parameters of crises: ‘Ordinary’ v. ‘extraordinary’ critique
The ‘crisis of legitimacy’ narrative that the African withdrawals fed into is not unique to
international criminal justice institutions and can be placed within a growing trend towards
sovereign resistance to international courts.52 From the ICC, the Southern African
Development Community Tribunal and the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights
to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the European Court of Justice and the
European Court of Human Rights, numerous states have either withdrawn or threatened to
withdraw their participation and jurisdictional consent from international courts in recent
years. In the current geopolitical climate the reflexive response of the commentariat has been
to proclaim the ‘backlash’ as symptomatic of ‘a changed world order prompted by the emer-
gence of a set of new socio-political constellations that share a pronounced scepticism towards
universalism’.53 Such responses are understandable given the exponential rise in proclamations
of sovereign exceptionalism, notable amongst which was Donald Trump’s statement to the 73rd
Session of the UN General Assembly in September 2018, where he declared that ‘America is
governed by Americans. We reject the ideology of globalism and we embrace the doctrine
of patriotism’.54
There is, however, no straightforward explanation for the alleged decline in support for
international courts, nor is there a one-size-fits-all solution to the issue, if indeed a solution is
required.55 However, the trend has given rise to a burgeoning literature unpacking the dynamics
of ‘backlash’56 against international courts from a socio-legal and international relations theory
50A. Kiyani, J. Reynolds and S. Xavier, ‘Foreword: Third World Approaches to International Criminal Law’, (2016) 14 JICJ
915, at 917–18.
51Ibid., at 918.
52M. Madsen, P. Cebulak and M. Wiebusch, ‘Backlash Against International Courts: Explaining the Forms and Patterns of
Resistence of International Courts’, (2018) 14 International Journal of Law in Context 197.
53Ibid., at 198.
54See Trump, supra note 33.
55See, J. Crawford, ‘The Current Political Discourse Concerning International Law’, (2018) 81 Mod.L.Rev. 1.
56Defined by Henry Lovat as, ‘intense and sustained government disapproval of tribunal conduct, accompanied by aggres-
sive steps to resist such conduct and to remove its legal force’. See H. Lovat, ‘International Criminal Tribunal Backlash’, in
K. Heller et al. (eds.), Oxford Handbook of International Criminal Law (forthcoming 2019), available at papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3253050. See also contributions to ‘Resistence to International Courts – Special Issue’, (2018) 14
International Journal of Law in Context, at 193–313.
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perspective. This literature has sought to distinguish between ‘resistance’, ‘pushback’, and ‘back-
lash’, and interestingly to separate ‘ordinary critique’ from ‘extraordinary critique’.57 Henry Lovat
defines ‘ordinary critique’ as ‘a form of resistance occurring within the playing field of
[international courts] and typically concerning specific legal developments in jurisprudence
and case-law’.58 ‘Extraordinary critique’ on the other hand, ‘goes beyond the ordinary playing field
of law and includes a critique of not only law but also that very institution – the court – and its
authority’.59
In the specific context of the ICC, this separation between ‘ordinary’ and ‘extraordinary’ cri-
tique is a useful lens through which to evaluate the propriety of the crisis label that seems to attach
to each and every event that negatively impacts on the legitimacy of the Court in some way. As this
Editorial has noted, the crisis narrative has become clichéd and exhausting in international crimi-
nal justice commentary and scholarship. Sergey Vasiliev points out, ‘there is no hard formula for
affixing the “crisis” label to specific events : : : “crisis” is not a category of objective reality; it is a
matter of perspective and group psychology (or psychoanalysis)’.60 The apportioning of the crisis
label might on the one hand be viewed as a symptom of hypochondria, or on the other hand as an
obvious addiction to the adrenaline-infused, endorphin-releasing effects of crisis; after all, we
never feel as simultaneously alive or as close to death as we do in the midst of a crisis. Crisis
can also act as a rallying cry; ‘“crises” impart ICL supporters with a therapeutic sense of shared
experience. Critical situations are the turning points around which professional and ideological
communities consolidate, raising issues of identity and belonging and making their membership
more defined’.61 However, it is also worth recalling in this respect Charlesworth’s stinging critique
that employing the language of crisis ‘encourages international lawyers to cast [themselves]
grandly in an heroic mould’.62
An appreciation of the distinction between ordinary and extraordinary critique has the poten-
tial to promote a more rational, constructive discourse on the issues confronting international
criminal justice institutions and international criminal law generally. The fact of the matter is that
not every bombastic statement from a government in the headlights of the ICC’s jurisdiction gives
rise to a full-blown crisis, nor do (partial or complete) judgments of acquittal, or frustrations over
the limited number of cases on the Court’s docket and the slow pace of proceedings. They can
certainly be posited as concerns, setbacks, or evidence of inefficiency and ineffectiveness, but to
feed every issue into the crisis narrative merely leads to a spike in blood pressure and the muting of
scholarly dialogue. To be clear, I am in no way suggesting that international criminal justice’s
legitimacy crisis is a figment of the imagination, far from it. Rather, I am merely arguing that
the language of crisis should be reserved for accumulated, related, instances of extraordinary cri-
tique. The labelling of acts of ordinary critique as yet another phase in the cycle of crisis inevitably
results in mainstream scholarship’s attention being taken away from the examination of, and
engagement with, the theoretical, historical and contemporary foundations of international crimi-
nal justice’s very real legitimacy crisis.63
The impulse of much of mainstream scholarship to fight the latest fire sparked by ordinary
critique might be viewed as a straightforward example of displacement behaviour; that is, a means
of avoiding facing up to the demons that continue to undermine the legitimacy of international
57Madsen, Cebulak and Wiebusch, supra note 53, at 197, 199. See also D. Caron and E. Shirlow, ‘Dissecting Backlash: The
Unarticulated Causes of Backlash and Its Unintended Consequences’, in A. Follesdal and G. Ulfstein (eds.), The Judicialization of
International Law: AMixed Blessing? (2018), 159; K. Alter, J. Gathii and L. Helfer, ‘Backlash Against International Courts inWest,
East and Southern Africa: Causes and Consequences’, (2016) 27 EJIL 293; Madsen, Cebulak and Wiebusch, supra note 53.
58Madsen, Cebulak and Wiebusch, supra note 53, at 199.
59Ibid., at 199.
60See Vasiliev, supra note 8, at 8.
61Ibid., at 12.
62See Charlesworth, supra note 17, at 387.
63Similar sentiments are expressed by Vasiliev, supra note 8, at 13.
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criminal law, frequently preferring instead to keep its head firmly in the sand.64 An example of this
is the way in which the twentieth anniversary of the signing of the Rome Statute was reflected on
in recent symposia in mainstream journals. Three in particular come to mind, namely: the Journal
of International Criminal Justice’s symposium, ‘The Intention of the Drafters – The ICC at 20’;65
the International Criminal Law Review’s special issue entitled, ‘The Rome Statute at Twenty:
Enhancing Efficiency and Effectiveness at the International Criminal Court’;66 and AJIL
Unbound’s ‘Symposium on the Rome Statute at Twenty’.67
All three are notable for their focus on various challenges such as: functional performance and
the development of various institutional actors and organs;68 the means by which efficiency gains
can be achieved; procedural lacunae and how they might be addressed; and concerns with regard
to the effectiveness of state co-operation. Contributions were dominated by practitioners, includ-
ing current and former members of the international criminal bench, who outnumbered contri-
butions from scholars by two to one.69 All three symposia offer valuable insights and are an
undoubted contribution to scholarship; however, they are speaking to a supportive, already con-
verted, congregation. They amount to little more than a reaffirmation of faith. There is acknowl-
edgement of some of the ICC’s shortcomings and the frustrations shared by its supporters, but the
message is clearly one of ‘we can and we will do better’. They also clearly play into the notion of
increased managerialism and reform of bureaucracy as tools designed to drive a sense of internal
progress and thereby increase the legitimacy of the ICC in the eyes of certain communities, in
particular stake-holders.70
Reading the symposia, I could not help but question if an opportunity had been wasted for a
more inclusive, interdisciplinary, cross-cutting exchange on some of the issues that go to the heart
of the legitimacy critique. It is also a clear indication that while interdisciplinary critique has
become a more prominent, dare I say, fashionable voice in mainstream international criminal
scholarship, it is far from being mainstreamed. This is exactly as it should be since the power
of critique lies in its transgressive potential, its refusal to be pigeonholed, and the perspective
offered by its externality.71
5. Parting remarks
This Editorial has offered some reflections on the pervasive and seemingly endless sense of crisis
attaching to the contemporary international criminal justice project. It has tried to give a sense of
how it has gone from being the protégé of the international legal order to being overwhelmed by
expectations, riddled with anxieties, and struggling with its existential legitimacy. The language of
crisis has become clichéd, overwrought and counterproductive. Nonetheless, international crimi-
nal justice’s crisis of legitimacy is unavoidable and has been laid bare by instances of extraordinary
64More sceptically, it might also be viewed as a tactic of ‘deliberate circumvention, muting, and exclusion’. I am grateful to
Sergey Vasiliev for this insight. See Vasiliev, supra note 8, at 13. For an account of crisis as distraction, see B. Authers and
H. Charlesworth, ‘The Crisis and the Quotidian in International Human Rights Law’, (2013) 44 NYIL 20, at 28–30.
65‘Symposium: The Intention of the Drafters – the ICC at 20’, (2018) 16 JICJ at 230–402.
66‘Special Issue: The Rome Statute at Twenty – Enhancing Efficiency and Effectiveness at the International Criminal Court’,
(2018) 3 Intl.C.L.R. at 377–575.
67‘Symposium on the Rome Statute at Twenty’, (2018) 112 AJIL Unbound at 155–86.
68Be it with respect to the Assembly of States Parties, the judiciary, the Office of the Prosecutor; defence counsel, or legal
counsel for victims. See supra note 67.
69Excluding Forewords, there were a total of 20 contributions to the three symposia; 14 from practitioners, six from
scholars.
70For an excellent treatment of this, see the article by Richard Clements in this issue of LJIL. R. Clements, ‘From
Bureaucracy to Management: The International Criminal Court’s Internal Progress Narrative’, (2019) 32 LJIL doi: 10.
1017/S092215651800064X.
71F. Mégret, ‘International Criminal Justice: A Critical Research Agenda’, in C. Schwöbel (ed.), Critical Approaches to
International Criminal Law (2014), at 46; see also Jacobs, supra note 5, at 2.
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critique. In this context we cannot ignore the fact that, like the rest of the international legal order,
it has felt the impact of the uncertainties and insecurities that have been an inevitable consequence
of the current geopolitical landscape and in particular the apparent backlash against international
courts. However, the silver lining has been the emergence of a more theoretically and methodo-
logically sophisticated body of international criminal justice scholarship that has sought to unpack
and expose the roots of the field’s crisis of legitimacy. Crisis has helped to generate the potential
for a widening of the scholarly space, however, while progress has been made this potential is
yet to be fully realized. It is essential that international criminal scholarship continues to embrace
inter- and cross-disciplinarity alongside its rich doctrinal heritage. LJIL, and the International
Criminal Courts and Tribunals section specifically, will continue to play its role in facilitating
diverse disciplinary exchanges. Such exchanges can only lead to a rich shared discourse even if
there will inevitably be occasions of defensiveness, intellectual discomfort, and disagreement as
we challenge the validity of the core beliefs that sit at the centre of the amygdala of international
criminal justice; this is a small price to pay in the service of the ‘eternal rhythm of progress, onward
and upward’.72
72See Zweig, supra note 2, at 3.
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